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Twenty-four years ago, Judge Frank Easterbrook delivered the
Sumner Canary Lecture on the topic “presidential review.”1 In that
memorable and often-cited lecture,2 Judge Easterbrook argued that
the President must interpret the Constitution in the performance of
his executive duties and act “at variance with statutory law, when
persuaded that the law departs from the Constitution.”3 He maintained that the President has a duty to exercise a power of executive
review on par with the power of judicial review exercised by the
Supreme Court.4 I want to return to the topic of executive review but
not limit myself to the topic of the President’s duty.

†.

Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit;
Commissioner, United States Sentencing Commission; Visiting
Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; Adjunct Professor,
Samford University, Cumberland School of Law. I thank Taylor Meehan
for her research assistance and helpful comments. This Article is based
on the 2014 Sumner Canary Lecture delivered by Judge Pryor at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law on October 2, 2014.

1.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
905 (1990).

2.

Many scholars have cited and expanded on Judge Easterbrook’s
argument. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible
Duty to Defend, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 507 (2012); Saikrishna Prakash,
Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 81 (2007); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against
Interpretive Supremacy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1539 (2005); John Harrison,
The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 Va.
L. Rev. 333 (1998); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267
(1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994).

3.

Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 905–06.

4.

Id. at 919–22.
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I want to endorse and restate Judge Easterbrook’s argument using
both a contemporary controversy and my earlier experience as a state
attorney general as frames of reference. In the last few years, both
federal and state executives have refused to defend laws respecting
traditional marriage. Although I cannot discuss whether the Constitution grants homosexual couples a right to marry while that issue is
being litigated in several courts, I will argue that supporters of
judicial restraint and the separation of powers should defend the
authority of both the federal executive and state executives not to
enforce or defend laws that they, in good faith, conclude violate the
Constitution.
I acknowledge that, by addressing the duty of state executives, I
go beyond what Judge Easterbrook was willing to argue. In his lecture, Judge Easterbrook declined to defend the authority of a state
executive to interpret the Constitution. He put it this way: “There is
a big difference between a power in the President and a power in
Orville Faubus.”5 But I will argue that the logic of Judge Easterbrook’s argument for presidential review suggests no material difference between federal and state executive review.
Let us consider the contemporary context. In 2011, President
Barack Obama concluded that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act, as applied to homosexual couples married under state law,
violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.6 Attorney General Eric Holder then
instructed attorneys in the Department of Justice not to defend
Section 3 of the Act in pending litigation. 7 But President Obama
instructed other executive officials to comply with Section 3 while
that litigation remained pending.8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
decided last year in United States v. Windsor9 that, even though the
executive branch refused to defend Section 3, there still remained a
“case or controversy” between Edith Windsor and the executive
branch.10
Meanwhile, in lawsuits challenging state constitutional amendments defining marriage as between a man and a woman, several
state attorneys general refused to defend those amendments and
instead argued that the amendments violate the Equal Protection
5.

Id. at 924.

6.

Letter from Eric H. Holder Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011).

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

10.

Id. at 2684–89.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.11 Even the attorneys general of a few Southern states—
Virginia, 12 North Carolina, 13 and Kentucky 14 —refused to defend the
marriage amendments to their state constitutions. Attorney General
Holder weighed in on that issue in February of this year and argued
that state attorneys general are not obligated to defend their state
constitutional amendments.15 He explained that “[i]f [he] were attorney general in Kansas in 1953, [he] would not have defended a Kansas
statute that put in place separate-but-equal facilities.”16
Some state officials refused to continue the defense of their state
laws only after lower federal courts ruled that traditional marriage
laws were unconstitutional. On May 21, Governor Tom Corbett, for
example, announced that he would not appeal a decision by a federal
district judge that the marriage laws of Pennsylvania violated the
federal Constitution.17 And on July 28, Attorney General Roy Cooper
of North Carolina announced that he would no longer defend the
marriage laws of his state after the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit ruled that the same kind of laws in Virginia
violated the federal Constitution.18
These refusals to defend laws have been sharply criticized,
especially by conservatives. Attorney General John Suthers of
11.

Juliet Eilperin, State Officials Decline to Defend Some Divisive Laws,
Wash. Post, July 19, 2013, at A1; Jess Bravin, Gay Marriage a Test
for State Laws’ Defenders, Wall St. J., Mar. 8–9, 2014, at A6; Matt
Apuzzo, Holder Sees Way to Curb Bans on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 25, 2014, at A1.

12.

Press Release, Commonwealth of Va. Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney
General Herring Changes Virginia’s Legal Position in Marriage Equality
Case (Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www.oag.state.va.us/index.
php/media-center/news-releases/96-attorney-general-herring-changesvirginia-s-legal-position-in-marriage-equality-case.

13.

Amanda Lamb, NC to Stop Defending Marriage Amendment, WRAL.
com (July 29, 2014), http://www.wral.com/nc-to-stop-defendingmarriage-amendment/13846324/.

14.

Aaron Blake & Sean Sullivan, Kentucky Gov. Steve Beshear (D) Will
Appeal Pro-Gay Marriage Ruling, Wash. Post (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/04/
kentucky-wont-appeal-gay-marriage-ruling/.

15.

Apuzzo, supra note 11.

16.

Id.

17.

Press Release, Office of the Governor of PA, Statement Regarding the
Opinion of Judge Jones in the Whitewood Case (May 21, 2014),
available at http://www.pa.gov/pages/newsdetails.aspx?agency=pagovn
ews&item=15643.

18.

See Lamb, supra note 13.
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Colorado, for example, published an op-ed in the Washington Post on
February 3 in which he argued that “this practice corrodes our system
of checks and balances, public belief in the power of democracy and
ultimately the moral and legal authority on which attorneys general
must depend.”19 General Suthers acknowledged that on some occasions an attorney general cannot “in good faith defend a law,” but he
argued that an attorney general must defend a controversial law so
long as it is not “‘clearly unconstitutional’” based on binding precedent of the Supreme Court.20 In January, Attorney General Lawrence
Wasden of Idaho argued that he had an “obligation as the attorney
general . . . to defend [his] state’s view, the people’s view.” 21 In
March, former attorney general Ken Cuccinelli of Virginia criticized
his successor, Mark Herring, for refusing to defend the Virginia
amendment on marriage. 22 Cuccinnelli asserted, “If you’re going to
run for attorney general, this is part of the job. . . . If you’re not
willing to do it, you ought not run.”23 In Michigan, Attorney General
Bill Schuette argued that he was “duty-bound to defend the wishes of
the voters. To do anything less would be a dereliction of duty.”24 And
conservative commentator Ed Whelan wrote earlier this year in The
Weekly Standard that state attorneys general must “vigorously defend
any [state] laws against challenge under federal law so long as there
are reasonable (i.e., nonfrivolous) grounds for doing so.”25
On this issue, the so-called duty to defend, I part ways with these
conservatives. I submit that neither the President nor the Attorney
General of the United States nor any state executive, whether a
governor or attorney general, is bound to either enforce or defend a
19.

John W. Suthers, Editorial, State Legal Authorities Turn Political,
Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 2014, at A15.

20.

Id.

21.

Scott Graf, Idaho Attorney General Wasden Will Continue to Defend
State’s Gay Marriage Ban, Boise St. Pub. Radio (Jan. 28, 2014, 6:00
AM), http://boisestatepublicradio.org/post/idaho-attorney-generalwasden-will-continue-defend-states-gay-marriage-ban.

22.

Jacob Fenston, Cuccinelli Blasts Herring for Not Defending Virginia
Gay Marriage Ban, WAMU 88.5 (Mar. 16, 2014), http://wamu.org/
news/14/03/16/cuccinelli_blasts_herring_for_not_defending_virginia
_gay_marriage_ban.

23.

Id.

24.

Bill Schuette, Letter to the Editor, Defending Traditional Marriage Is
Defending the State Constitution, Detroit Free Press, Mar. 25,
2014, http://archive.freep.com/article/20140325/OPINION04/30325001
7/michigan-gay-marriage-same-sex-bill-schuette-response-rights.

25.

Edward Whelan, Falling Down on the Job: State AGs Shirk Their Duty
to Defend State Laws, Wkly. Standard, Feb. 17, 2014, at 14, 16.

282

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 2·2014
The Separation of Powers and the Federal and State
Executive Duty to Review the Law

law that the executive officer in good faith concludes violates the
federal Constitution. Executive officers, both federal and state, are
duty-bound to interpret and obey the Constitution in the performance
of their duties, and in doing so, they owe no deference to other
authorities.
To explain my perspective, I will address three matters. First, I
will explain the classical understanding of an executive’s authority to
interpret the Constitution in the performance of his duties. Second, I
will explain how that understanding guided me in the performance of
my duties in different kinds of legal controversies when I formerly
served as a state attorney general. Third, I will explain the
comparative advantages of having executive officials take seriously the
duty to obey the Constitution without deferring to other branches of
government.

I. The Duty of Executive Review
The duty to interpret the Constitution begins and ends with
every officer’s oath. The Constitution provides that all executives,
legislators, and judges, both federal and state, “shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.” 26 That clause
appears in clause 3 of Article VI, and fittingly follows the Supremacy
Clause in clause 2 of Article VI. And the Supremacy Clause, of
course, makes the Constitution the supreme law of the land. So when
an executive officer, federal or state, swears to support the
Constitution, he swears to support it as the highest of all laws.
In the event of a conflict between the Constitution and a federal
or state law, every executive must support the Constitution. As Chief
Justice John Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison, 27 “a law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.”28 That concluding passage of Marbury means that a law in conflict with the Constitution is
a nullity—that is, no law at all—and all departments—executive,
legislative, and judicial—must follow the Constitution as the law and
ignore the nullity. And that logic applies no matter whether the
executive sworn to support the Constitution is a federal or state
officer.
Our constitutional history establishes that many presidents have
exercised an independent power of executive review. Washington,
Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, and Lincoln, among others, interpreted
the Constitution in the performance of their executive duties without
26.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3.

27.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

28.

Id. at 180.
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deferring to the interpretations of either the judiciary or Congress.
And sometimes those presidents had the last word.
As Judge Easterbrook explained in his lecture, early presidents
often vetoed legislation on constitutional grounds.29 President Washington vetoed the first bill apportioning representatives among the
states.30 President Madison vetoed a bill chartering a church in the
District of Columbia31 and a bill for internal improvements32 both on
constitutional grounds. And President Jackson vetoed a bill to reauthorize the national bank33 even though the Supreme Court had held
that Congress had the power to charter the bank.34
Thomas Jefferson provided perhaps the most provocative
examples of executive review. Jefferson considered the Sedition Act of
1798 to violate the First Amendment.35 As a result, while he served as
president, he refused to prosecute anyone for violating the Act, and he
pardoned all who had been convicted for violating it even though the
courts had upheld the Act.36
President Lincoln, of course, rejected the decision of the Supreme
Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford.37 Lincoln acknowledged the authority of the decision as between the parties.38 But he refused to abide by
its rule in other matters of executive responsibility.39

29.

Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 907–08.

30.

George Washington, Veto Message (Apr. 5, 1792), in 1 A Compilation
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, at
124 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).

31.

James Madison, Veto Message (Feb. 21, 1811), in 1 A Compilation of
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, at 489–
90 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).

32.

James Madison, Veto Message (Mar. 3, 1817), in 1 A Compilation of
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, at 584–
85 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).

33.

Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A Compilation
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, at
576, 582 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).

34.

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 774
(1824).

35.

Paulsen, supra note 2, at 255.

36.

Id.

37.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

38.

3 Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy,
Illinois, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 245, 255
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).

39.

4 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in The Collected
Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra note 38 at 262, 268.
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Critics of executive review say that the president has a duty of
faithful execution of law, 40 but that argument begs the question,
“Execution of what law?” The Supremacy Clause declares that the
Constitution is the supreme law. And Marbury declares, as Hamilton
had argued in The Federalist, 41 that conflicting laws are void. If
legislation conflicts with the supreme law, which must the executive
faithfully execute—the legislation or the supreme law? The question
answers itself.
What about the argument that a state attorney general owes a
duty, as a lawyer, to his client—the State or the people—to make an
argument in defense of state law? Conservative commentator Ed
Whelan’s central criticism of the state attorneys general who have
refused to defend the marriage laws of their states is that those
attorneys general have abandoned their client. But the problem with
that argument is that the state attorney general is the client.42 The
state attorney general is an executive officer who ordinarily serves
either by appointment of the governor or more often by election as an
independent officer. Like any executive officer, the state attorney
general takes an oath to support the Constitution in the performance
of his duties. The state attorney general, as the chief legal officer of
the state government, has duties that are not equivalent to those of a
private lawyer representing a client. The state attorney general
frequently also serves as the chief prosecutor, a minister of justice who
must seek the truth in the performance of his duties. The state
attorney general is no ordinary lawyer. His first duty is to the
Constitution.43

40.

See, e.g., Curt A. Levey & Kenneth A. Klukowski, Take Care Now:
Stare Decisis and the President’s Duty to Defend Acts of Congress, 37
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 377 (2013).

41.

The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

42.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct: Preamble and Scope § 18
(2013). (“Under various legal provisions, including constitutional,
statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers
may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes
in the client in private client-lawyer relationships.”).

43.

I acknowledge that, in some but not all states, an attorney general may
not mount, as a plaintiff, an affirmative challenge to the constitutionality of a state law because the attorney general is the defender of
those laws. See Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the
States, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 213, 257–58 (2014). But I am unaware of
any state judicial decision that would deny the authority of a state
attorney general to admit that a state law violates the Constitution
when representing a state defendant.
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II. Examples from My Service in an Office
of State Attorney General
Allow me to offer four examples from my tenure in an office of
state attorney general as each example presents nuances about the
duty to defend and executive review. The first involves a state ban of
the commercial distribution of sex toys, a silly law that I defended in
litigation—despite criticism—because I concluded that it did not
violate the Constitution. The second involves the installation of a
monument of the Ten Commandments in a state judicial building,
which I did not think necessarily violated the Constitution, but litigation about that monument led me to prosecute a state chief justice on
charges of judicial misconduct after he refused to abide by a federal
injunction to remove the monument. The third involves a state law
restricting school prayer that I refused to defend after I concluded
that the law violated the free-speech and free-exercise rights of
students. And the fourth involves two voting rights cases I handled
under the direction of then Attorney General and now U.S. Senator
Jeff Sessions. In those cases, we confessed error in federal court
because other state executive and judicial officials had violated the
civil rights of Alabama voters.
Let us consider the silly law first. In 1998, a year after I took the
oath to serve as attorney general, the Alabama Legislature amended
the criminal code to make it “unlawful for any person to knowingly
distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to
distribute . . . any device designed or marketed as useful primarily
for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary
value.”44 A first offense was a misdemeanor, and a second offense was
a felony.45 The law did not prohibit the use or possession of sex toys,
but only the commercial distribution of them.46 Not surprisingly, some
sellers of sex toys and their customers filed a federal lawsuit to
challenge that state law. We now cite that lawsuit, to the amusement
of my friends and law clerks, as Williams v. Pryor.
I defended that silly law in two appeals to the court on which I
now serve, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. Each time, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with my argument
that the law was constitutional. The first ruling involved a facial
challenge to the law,47 and the second ruling involved an as-applied

44.

Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ala.
Code § 13A–12–200.2(a)(1) (Supp. 1998)).

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.
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challenge. 48 On both occasions, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court, which had ruled that the law violated the Constitution.
In the first appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the law satisfied
the rational-basis test based on “the State’s legitimate government
interest in public morality.” 49 In the second appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit refused to “redefine the constitutional right to privacy to
cover the commercial distribution of sex toys.”50
Defending that law was not always pleasant. Some voters fail to
appreciate the distinction between a silly law and an unconstitutional
law, and the Alabama press had a field day mocking the law and my
defense of it. But the Eleventh Circuit understood what was at stake
when it wrote, “If the people of Alabama in time decide that a
prohibition on sex toys is misguided, or ineffective, or just plain silly,
they can repeal the law and be finished with the matter.”51 At one
point, one of the legislative sponsors of the law visited me and urged
me to stop defending the law. I responded that my duty required me
to defend the law so long as I thought the law was constitutional. I
had a duty to defend the law even though I had no interest in
devoting substantial resources of my office to enforcing it. I suggested
to the legislator that he sponsor a bill to repeal the law. I assured him
that I would not criticize that effort, but he declined to do so. I
suppose he did not want to draw any new attention to his role in
sponsoring the law in the first place. But again, my duty as a state
executive was clear: I had a duty to defend the silly law because it did
not violate the Constitution.
Let us consider next the controversy that received the most public
scrutiny during my tenure as a state attorney general. That
controversy involved not a state law but a decoration in a state
judicial building. After his election in 2000 as the Chief Justice of
Alabama, Roy Moore designed and installed a monument of the Ten
Commandments to “depict the moral foundation of law.” 52 Chief
Justice Moore invited a Christian media organization to film the
installation, 53 and soon afterward several citizens filed two federal
lawsuits that sought an injunction to remove the monument.54 I had
differences of opinion with Chief Justice Moore about several matters,
but I did not think that a display of the Ten Commandments in a
48.

Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004).

49.

240 F.3d at 956.

50.

378 F.3d at 1250.

51.

Id.

52.

Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 891 So. 2d 848, 850 (Ala. 2004).

53.

Id. at 850–51 n.2.

54.

Id. at 852.
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courthouse violated the Constitution. After all, depictions of the
Decalogue appear in other American courtrooms, including in the
courtroom of the Supreme Court of the United States. But Chief
Justice Moore did not make his defense of his monument easy as he
questioned longstanding precedents about the First Amendment.
Eventually both the district court55 and the Eleventh Circuit56 ruled
that Moore’s monument violated the Constitution. Then things got
interesting.
Chief Justice Moore refused to obey an injunction to remove the
monument.57 Moore argued that he could ignore the rulings of the federal courts as contrary to the Constitution.58 He argued that the federal courts, not he, had violated the Constitution.59 His approach of
state review of a federal judgment would turn the Supremacy Clause
upside down.
I disagreed with Chief Justice Moore’s approach. I instead assisted
the associate justices of the state supreme court in removing the
monument and complying with the federal injunction.60 Although I
did not think that a depiction of the Ten Commandments in a
courthouse necessarily violated the Constitution, I recognized that
Article III of the Constitution vested the federal courts with the
judicial power to decide cases or controversies arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. I recognized that Chief
Justice Moore’s refusal to comply with an injunction entered after he
had been given an opportunity to defend his position in a trial and an
appeal was lawless. And I later prosecuted him on charges of judicial
misconduct and succeeded in having him removed from office.61
Now let us consider a case where I refused to defend a state law
because I concluded that the law violated the Constitution. In 1993,
the Alabama Legislature enacted a law about school prayer.62 The law
provided that “non-sectarian, non-proselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer . . . shall be permitted during compulsory or noncompulsory” public school events. 63 A parent of a public school
student and others filed a federal lawsuit that challenged that law as
55.

Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (M.D. Ala. 2002).

56.

Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).

57.

891 So. 2d at 853.

58.

Id. at 856–57.

59.

Id.

60.

Id. at 853.

61.

Id. at 853–54.

62.

Chandler v. James, 958 F. Supp. 1550, 1553 (M.D. Ala. 1997).

63.

Id. (quoting Ala. Code § 16–1–20.3(b) (1995)).
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violating the First Amendment, and in March 1997, two months after
I had taken the oath to serve as the attorney general, the district
court ruled in the parent’s favor.64 I quickly studied the ruling because
I had not previously represented the state, as a deputy attorney
general, in that litigation, and I announced that I would not appeal
the ruling. I agreed with the district court that the Alabama law
infringed the rights of students under the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. As the district court
concluded, the Alabama law “define[d] students’ free speech and
religion rights too narrowly. When these rights attach to students in
school, they may engage in sectarian, proselytizing religious speech.”65
I never thought I had a duty to defend that Alabama law because
I thought it was plainly unconstitutional. I felt no obligation to
appeal the ruling to the Eleventh Circuit or to petition the Supreme
Court to allow further judicial review of the law even though neither
of those courts had ever squarely addressed a law like it. And I felt no
obligation to defend the constitutional interpretation of the Alabama
Legislature embodied in that law. The Alabama law favored what it
called non-sectarian and non-proselytizing prayer even though it is
unclear whether speech that is both non-sectarian and nonproselytizing can even be called a prayer. The law purported to
uphold the free-speech and free-exercise rights of students, but it
violated those rights instead by favoring certain kinds of speech over
others.
Later, the district court and I disagreed about the requirements of
the First Amendment when the district court enjoined a public school
system from permitting students to engage in any kind of religious
speech at a school event.66 In two appeals, the Eleventh Circuit agreed
with me that the First Amendment protects student-initiated prayer
and religious speech, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated the injunction.67 But the governor hired separate counsel and argued that even
teacher-led prayer was permissible. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that
argument, of course, but the governor, as a matter of executive
review, thought that Supreme Court precedents in that area were
wrong. I stuck to defending the free-speech rights of the students.
My decisions about the executive duty to defend were influenced
by the perspective of my predecessor, now U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions,
for whom I had served as deputy attorney general in charge of any
civil litigation that he considered to be a priority of his admini64.

Id. at 1568.

65.

Id. at 1561.

66.

Chandler v. James, 985 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Ala. 1997).

67.

Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999); Chandler v.
Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000).
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stration. In that role, I had confessed that state officials had violated
the federal civil rights of Alabama voters in two cases. And in both
cases, General Sessions refused to defer to state authorities when
doing so would have violated federal law.
In the highest profile representation that General Sessions
appointed me to undertake,68 I confessed that a state judicial ruling
violated the constitutional rights of voters.69 A state circuit court had
ordered state election officials to count previously uncounted absentee
ballots in the election for Chief Justice of Alabama in 1994. 70 In
keeping with the longstanding interpretation of state officials, the
local election officials had refused to count any absentee ballot for
which a voter’s signature had not been witnessed by either two adults
or a notary public.71 When the state circuit court ordered the counting of the excluded ballots after the election, the challenger in the
election for Chief Justice filed a federal complaint and obtained an
injunction to stop the after-the-fact changing of the rules of the
election to alter the outcome.72 When General Sessions assumed office,
we changed the litigation position of the State and refused to defend
the ruling of the state circuit court. We agreed with the challenger in
the federal lawsuit that changing the rules of the election would
violate the constitutional rights of Alabama voters. We maintained
that position about the requirements of federal law, even after the
Eleventh Circuit certified the question of state law to the Supreme
Court of Alabama, which sustained the ruling of the state circuit
court.73 General Sessions and I, as his deputy, never deferred to the
decisions of the state courts or defended them as not violating federal
law.
In the second case, I confessed error that a state-sponsored settlement of a voting-rights lawsuit violated federal law.74 When voters
filed a lawsuit that challenged the at-large election of appellate
judges, the previous attorney general crafted a settlement. 75 That
settlement, which had been approved by a federal district court,
required the creation of new judgeships on those courts to be filled by
gubernatorial appointment—not election—and created a nominating
68.
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Id. at 406–07.

72.

Id. at 405.
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commission for those appointments. And that nominating commission
had a racial quota. But on behalf of General Sessions, I confessed
error. Voters intervened in the lawsuit and challenged the settlement.
Those intervening voters and I agreed that the settlement violated the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Eleventh Circuit ruled, as we had
argued, that Alabama could not remedy a denial of voting rights with
an appointment process.76 The whole point of the Voting Rights Act
is to allow voters an opportunity to elect the candidates of their
choice.
In none of these instances where I, or my predecessor, refused to
defend a state law, state judicial ruling, or state-sponsored settlement
did any conservatives criticize our exercise of the power of executive
review. Perhaps that absence of criticism can be attributed to the fact
that political conservatives liked the end result of our decisions. The
governor of my state favored teacher-led prayer, but he agreed with
me that a state law favoring non-sectarian and non-proselytizing
prayers was not worth defending. The state judicial ruling about
absentee ballots that we refused to defend favored the incumbent
chief justice, a Democrat supported by the trial lawyers’ association,
and our position in the federal lawsuit favored the Republican
challenger supported by the business community. And the statesponsored settlement of the voting rights case we refused to defend
had been crafted by a Democratic attorney general and favored the
interests of his political party.
Perhaps the politics of the moment can help a state executive
better interpret the Constitution. It can fairly be said, after all, that
Presidents Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln favored the interests of
their political allies when they engaged in executive review. It can be
said too that President Obama and the state executives, all
Democrats, who have favored a constitutional right for homosexual
couples to marry have sided with their political allies, but we will
have to wait to see whether their argument ever achieves the
widespread acceptance that Jefferson’s and Lincoln’s perspectives now
enjoy.
What matters is not whether an executive defends a law with
which he or his political party disagrees but whether his
interpretation adheres to the text and structure of the Constitution.
Jefferson and Lincoln passed that test. And, when contested, my legal
positions in the earlier-described controversies, where I sided with my
political allies, prevailed in the end—in the objective view of the
federal courts.
In my experiences as a state executive, I understood my duty to
be true to the Constitution and federal law as supreme. I understood
76.

Id. at 1071.
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that my oath required me to defend laws that do not violate the
Constitution and to refrain from violating the civil rights of
Americans. I understood that duty required me to interpret the
Constitution and not surrender my responsibility of interpretation to
another branch of government. I understood that I would violate my
oath if I were to enforce and defend an unconstitutional law that had
caused a real injury to some person and that I would shirk my
responsibility if I were to leave it to the judiciary to correct the
problem without my aid. And I understood that, when the judiciary
decided a case within its jurisdiction, the Constitution obliged me to
respect the final judgment of the judiciary in that case.
The rule of law demands that conservatives who favor the
exercise of executive review not criticize liberals for exercising that
power but consider instead the merits of their interpretations.
Conservatives can make their case against a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage, but conservatives should respect the authority for
executive review, as practiced by Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln.

III. The Comparative Advantages of Executive Review
There are at least three comparative advantages to this classical
understanding of executive review. First, for those concerned about
respecting the judicial role, the classical understanding of an
executive’s duty better protects the integrity of the judicial process.
Second, a classical understanding of executive review forces public
officials to take the Constitution seriously. Third, when we accept the
rightfulness of executive review, we can move beyond a trivial debate
about doing a job without thought of its consequences to the important discussion about what the Constitution means.
As to the first advantage, those concerned about the judicial role
should want the judiciary to entertain controversies where the
executive enforces and defends the law because the executive
genuinely believes that the law satisfies the Constitution. An executive committed to enforcing the law is more likely to make the best
argument for its defense. The Supreme Court explained long ago that,
because a “collusive” suit “is not in any real sense adversary,” it fails
to “safeguard . . . the integrity of the judicial process, . . . which
[is] . . . indispensable
to
adjudication
of
constitutional
questions . . . .” 77 But when the executive enforces a law that it
refuses to defend or defends a law that it believes should not be
enforced, the executive invites charges of collusion.
The Supreme Court debated what to do about this problem in
Windsor, where the Obama administration continued to enforce the
77.

United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943).
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Defense of Marriage Act while it refused to defend the constitutionality of the Act. The majority described that posture as having
“created a procedural dilemma.”78 The majority fretted that it had to
protect what it called “the Supreme Court’s primary role in determining the constitutionality of a law that has inflicted real injury on a
plaintiff” and avoid having that role become “only secondary to the
President’s.”79 The majority declared that “it poses grave challenges
to the separation of powers for the Executive at a particular moment
to be able to nullify Congress’s enactment solely on its own initiative
and without any determination from the Court.”80 But Justice Scalia
responded in a dissenting opinion joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Thomas, “[w]here the Executive is enforcing an unconstitutional law, suit will of course lie; but if, in that suit, the Executive
admits the unconstitutionality of the law, the litigation should end in
an order or a consent decree enjoining enforcement.”81
I agree with Justice Scalia’s related suggestion that the better
course for the executive is “neither to enforce nor to defend the
statute he believe[s] to be unconstitutional.”82 The executive sends a
terrible message when he enforces a law that he believes violates the
Constitution. That is, the executive tells the person he injures that
enforcing a defective law matters more than respecting the Constitution. When he later admits the unconstitutionality of the law in court,
the executive tells the injured person that having the judiciary take
years to make a final judgment about whether the law violates the
Constitution matters more than the injury the executive admits causing in the interim. But if the executive refuses to enforce the law he
believes violates the Constitution, he ordinarily injures no person and
leaves for another day the duty of defending that law for an executive
committed to its enforcement. If that day comes, because the voters
decide to elect an executive who believes the law is constitutional and
should be enforced, then the judiciary will likely have the opportunity
to adjudicate the question without any procedural dilemma. The judiciary has no right to complain about being relegated to a secondary
role so long as it remains empowered to decide cases or controversies
where the parties are truly adverse.
I acknowledge that, when a state attorney general refuses to
defend an unconstitutional law, the controversy may remain justiciable because he may play no role in its enforcement. States ordinarily
78.
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lack the unitary executive of the federal government. That is why the
Attorney General of Ohio last term filed a brief in defense of an
elections commission and a separate brief as amicus curiae about the
constitutionality of a state law in a case before the Supreme Court.83
In a case that involved the Federal Elections Commission, Solicitor
General Robert Bork and Assistant Solicitor Frank Easterbrook too
filed a separate amicus brief in a landmark case about the constitutionality of a federal campaign finance law.84 But the multiple legal
positions that accompany a government with several executive officers
means that no harm comes from a state attorney general providing an
independent perspective that a law violates the Constitution. The
judiciary can still hear an opposing argument from an officer charged
with enforcing the law and perhaps another official such as the
governor.
As to the second advantage of the classical understanding,
executive review requires elected officials to take the Constitution
seriously. Executive review demands that elected officials not be lazy
in the performance of their duties, and it allows the people to hold
executives accountable for their interpretations. We should not allow
executives to escape responsibility for violating the Constitution by
shifting the blame to the judiciary as the only branch with the
authority to interpret our fundamental law. We should not condone,
for example, a president or governor signing legislation while denouncing it as unconstitutional and leaving the judiciary responsible for
repairing any damage from that violation. For example, when he
signed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, President
George W. Bush stated that the legislation had “flaws” and presented
“serious constitutional concerns.”85 I agree with Professor Saikrishna
Prakash that this practice of sign and denounce “should be consigned
to the ash heap of history, like communism and bell bottom pants.”86
After all, this practice only encourages legislators to enact more
unconstitutional legislation.
Executives—and legislators, for that matter—swear to support
the Constitution, but they take no oath to judicial precedents. And
83.
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we should not want them to do so. Executives should consider judicial
precedents for their persuasive weight, but the judiciary has not
always been correct in its interpretation of the Constitution. At times
the Supreme Court has been outrageously wrong. The federal courts
were wrong, and President Jefferson was right about the Sedition Act.
The Supreme Court was wrong, and President Lincoln was right
about Dred Scott. And that infamous mistake by the Supreme Court,
of course, helped cause the Civil War. Sometimes executives have prevailed in the course of history in interpreting the most contested and
important provisions of the Constitution, and we should be thankful
for it.
And the judiciary cannot deny its own fallibility. After all, the
Supreme Court was wrong in Plessy v. Ferguson,87 as the Supreme
Court later admitted in Brown v. Board of Education.88 An executive
necessarily errs when he defers to the precedents of the Supreme
Court, instead of the Constitution itself, as the supreme law of the
land. As Attorney General Edwin Meese explained in a famous speech
more than a quarter-century ago, if the decisions of the Supreme
Court were on par with the Constitution itself, then the Court could
not overrule or even reconsider its erroneous decisions. 89 And the
whole reason the judiciary has jury trials, appellate review, and
petitions for writs of certiorari is that the judiciary needs those
processes to help correct its own errors.
Executive review respects the fact that Americans can disagree in
good faith about the meaning of the Constitution. After all, even
when it adheres to precedent in its controversial decisions, the
Supreme Court is often divided five to four with excellent legal minds
in sharp disagreement about what the Constitution requires. If justices of the Supreme Court disagree among themselves about the
meaning of the Constitution in the exercise of their judicial power,
then other constitutional officers too have a right in the exercise of
their powers to disagree with the Supreme Court about the meaning
of the Constitution. To be sure, the Constitution is law, and courts
have expertise in construing laws, but executives ordinarily either are
lawyers too—as in the case of state attorneys general—or, in the case
of governors and the President, have expert lawyers to provide them
counsel. At least with executives, the American people have the right
to oust them from office when they misconstrue the Constitution.
Congress, of course, has never impeached a federal judge for misconstruing the Constitution.
87.
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Finally, when we agree about the legitimacy of executive review,
we can have a more meaningful debate about what the Constitution
actually requires. When an executive interprets the Constitution in a
controversial manner and an opponent charges that the task should
be left to the judiciary, we hear only one side of the debate about
what the Constitution requires. To criticize an executive for interpreting the Constitution is not to criticize his interpretation, but his
interpretation is what matters. Instead of demanding that the executive defend a law, we should debate whether the law violates the
Constitution. Instead of hearing one state attorney general criticize
another for “not doing his job,” we should hear two attorneys general
explain their conflicting interpretations of the Constitution. If one
attorney general concludes that homosexual couples have a constitutional right to marry never before recognized in our constitutional
history, then that attorney general should explain his interpretation.
If another attorney general disagrees and concludes that the Constitution leaves the definition of marriage to the States, then that attorney
general too should explain his interpretation. But that debate will be
impoverished if it instead involves only the propriety of executive
review, which is as old as the Republic itself.
History proves that our country benefits when ordinary
Americans and their officials engage in serious constitutional debate.
Our Nation benefited from those kinds of serious debates, for
example, at our Founding, during and after our Civil War, and during
the Civil Rights Movement. We should welcome appeals to the
Constitution by our elected officials. We should welcome appeals to
the Constitution in debates among lawyers and judges whether associated with the Federalist Society or the American Constitution Society. We should welcome appeals to the Constitution by our citizenry
in our political discourse too whether from the Tea Party or the
American Civil Liberties Union.
The Constitution is not the exclusive province of the judiciary.
The Constitution begins with three words—“We the people”—because
the Constitution belongs to the American people. The American
people wrote it, ratified it, and many times amended it, and many
thousands of Americans died fighting for it. The American people own
it. And the American people have a right to demand that our leaders
obey it as the supreme law of the land. The right to make that
demand explains why the Constitution requires all our high officials—
executives, legislators, and judges—to swear an oath to support it.
We say that we have a government of laws, not of men, but that
saying presupposes that every branch can and will interpret it and
follow it in the performance of its powers. We should demand nothing
less.

296

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 2· 2014

Facilitating Incomplete
Contracts
Wendy Netter Epstein†
Abstract
Contract law abhors incompleteness. Although no contract can be
entirely complete, the idea of a purposefully incomplete or underspecified contract is antithetical to lawyers’ ideals of certainty for the
parties and for the law. Indeed, contract law is designed to incentivize
parties to specifically articulate their intentions. Yet there is a
growing body of interdisciplinary work in economics and cognitive
psychology demonstrating that highly specified contracts tend to stifle
intrinsic motivation and innovation, whereas less-specified contracts—
particularly in public-private contracting, IP, and contracting for
innovation—can induce higher effort levels and a more cooperative
principal–agent relationship than the traditional approach. Nevertheless, there remain both entrenched doctrinal and sociolegal deterrents
to drafting less-specified contracts.
This Article argues that the existing doctrinal roadblocks to
incomplete contracts are out of step with the normative goals of
commercial contracting—promoting efficiency and incentivizing commercial activity. The indefiniteness doctrine and current approaches
to contract interpretation, for instance, over-deter the use of
incomplete contracting even when it would be efficient. Ultimately,
this Article suggests a new doctrinal approach for those contracts
where the law should incentivize incomplete contracting, borrowing
from principles of constitutional interpretation: dynamic contextualist
interpretation. Courts should look not only to party intent at the
moment when the contract was formed but should consider how
intentions developed during contract performance. Rather than punishing incompleteness, flexibility should guide determinations of
validity and questions of interpretation.
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